We develop a model of bargaining that provides a rationale for the difference in the method of negotiation, depending on the nature of the conßict. We distinguish those negotiations that take place previous to a potential conßict (peacekeeping), and negotiations inside the conßict (peacemaking). In these contexts, we study the role of a mediator that tries to achieve a certain balance between the efficiency of the agreement and the equality of the sharing. We show that the credibility of the mediator comes from her willingness to impose delays in the negotiation, even if that implies costs. We also Þnd how the "weak" player in the conßict can strategically proÞt from the mediator's quest for equality. Finally, we show how the capacity of the mediator to induce a higher equality in the sharing is always higher in a peacemaking situation than in a peacekeeping one.
Negotiations among potentially conßicting parties (for instance, international agreements) are a clear example of the application of Game Theory and, in particular, of Bargaining Theory.
This Theory has been, throughout the years, a very successful area of research. The theoretical advances, as well as the applications, have shed a lot of light on the way agents or institutions negotiate in order to achieve a mutually beneÞcial agreement.
However, there is a crucial feature in many real-life economic negotiations that is still poorly understood: the role played by arbitrators and mediators in negotiation processes. While arbitrators impose an agreement, mediators facilitate the reaching of an agreement by the players (Muthoo, 1999) . The importance of these professional negotiators is clear. In most international negotiations, the United Nations (UN) sends a group of diplomats (supervised by a main negotiator) whose aim is to help the parties involved in the conßict to achieve a successful agreement.
In other domains, such as domestic conßicts caused by damaging strikes, the legislation usually allows governments to impose an arbitrator to the parties. 1 In spite of its importance, the literature on Bargaining has seldom approached the role of these negotiators, and has essentially done it by treating them as passive agents with an exogenously predetermined role. On the one hand, the approach followed by Compte and Jehiel (1995) and Manzini and Mariotti (2001) , analyzes the role of arbitrators as pre-Þxed outside options of the bargaining process. On the other hand, Jarque, Ponsatí and Sákovics (2003) and Copic and Ponsatí (2003) study mediators as information Þlters in a context of two-sided asymmetric information. In theses cases, the role of the mediators is to make the agreement public as soon as the parties have made mutually acceptable offers.
An exception to these approaches are the works by Ponsatí (2001) and Manzini and Ponsatí (2002) , in which third-parties (other than the agents directly involved in the conßict) take strategic decisions that may affect the negotiation process. In their models, these parties are stake-holders (agents indirectly affected by the outcome of the bargaining process), and they intervene in the negotiation through the promise of monetary transfers to the contenders in order to ease the termination of the conßict.
In this work, we are interested in analyzing the role of mediators who have the capacity to strategically intervene in a conßict, but from a very different perspective of previous works.
In our framework, the mediator does not beneÞt from transfers of the parties involved in the conßict, and her intervention is driven by her interest in achieving a certain balance between the efficiency and the equality of the Þnal agreement. Moreover, her mediation activity is not conducted through the promise of monetary transfers to the parties, but through her capacity players is undermined by the existence of a conßict, that generates a ßow of damages for the players in a heterogeneous way. We also prove that, in this case, more equality can be achieved by giving the initiative in the negotiation process to the ex-ante strong player (in contrast with what happens in unmediated bargaining processes). If the mediator gives the Þrst mover's advantage to the weak player, this agent will strategically use in his favor the higher costs that the continuation of the conßict implies for him.
When moving to a peacekeeping scenario, the position of the mediator, rather than improving, worsens. In this situations, the conßict is only a potential outcome of the process, and the agents will strategically threat the mediator with the option of declaring the conßict, and moving to a peacemaking scenario. At equilibrium, the players link the non-acceptance of their offers to the start of the conßict, and this severely undermines the mediator's capacity to increase the egalitarianism of the Þnal agreement. In particular, we show that, in peacekeeping negotiations, the intervention of the mediator is unable to induce a more egalitarian sharing than in face-to-face negotiations. As a conclusion from the analysis of the two different scenarios, we observe that the capacity of the mediator to induce more egalitarian agreements is always higher in peacemaking negotiations.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we introduce the economic environment and the model. Section 3 analyzes the peacemaking situation, that is, the mediation activity when the conßict has already started, and in Section 4 we study the peacekeeping scenario, which corresponds to a situation previous to a potential conßict. Section 5 concludes and comments on possible extensions. We provide an Appendix in Section 6.
The Economic Environment
We model negotiations between two parties in the presence of a potential conßict. The players bargain à la Rubinstein, under complete information, over the division of a Þxed surplus with value s ∈ R + . The bargaining process is inÞnitely repeated and players have an homogeneous discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). There are two types of negotiations that differ in the timing of the bargaining process with respect to the conßict: peacemaking and peacekeeping negotiations.
In peacemaking processes, the conßict has already started. The negotiation takes place inside the conßict and the players bargain to try to stop it. From a game-theoretical perspective, these are negotiations with no-cooperation as the status-quo. In this case, the agents suffer a cost of conßict each period. The cost suffered by player i each period of conßict is (1 − δ)c i . This cost is normalized so that the discounted cost of being in continuous conßict is c i > 0 (i = 1, 2). To simplify, we suppose that c 1 = c > c 2 = 0. Hereinafter we will denote the agent who suffer the cost of conßict (i.e., agent 1) as the "weak" player and agent 2 as the "strong" player.
We also assume that s > c. This means that the conßict does not destroy the whole surplus that can be divided among the two players. 4 In peacekeeping negotiations, the objective of the bargaining process is to divide the surplus s between the parties, and to avoid the declaration of the conßict. Since the conßict has not already started, neither player suffers a cost of conßict each period. From a game-theoretical perspective, these are negotiations with no-cooperation as an outside-option. In the bargaining process, each player has the option of breaking up the negotiations and move to the conßict. In case of opting out, negotiations will continue in a peacemaking environment.
The objective of this paper is to analyze the role of mediation in these negotiations processes. We study mediators that have the capacity to strategically intervene in the conßict in the following sense: the mediator can choose between allowing the agents involved in the conßict to conduct direct negotiations, or forcing them to undertake indirect negotiations. In direct (face-to-face) negotiations, the players bargain à la Rubinstein and the only role of the mediator is to choose who is the player that has the right to start the negotiation process. In indirect (mediated) negotiations, the mediator takes an active role in the process, by deciding whether to submit an offer to the other party or not. If the mediator can credibly commit not to submit a proposal (that, if submitted, would be accepted), then she will be able to alter the outcome of the bargaining process. The credibility of the threats depends crucially on the preferences of the mediator. Her main trade-off is equality versus efficiency. In terms of efficiency, the best the mediator can do is not to block any proposal that, if submitted, would be accepted. If the mediator wants to affect the Þnal sharing, that is, to increase the equality by reducing the Þrst mover advantage of the initial proposer, she has to credibly threaten with "blocking" proposals, even if this implies (out of equilibrium) a delay in the agreement.
We parametrize the mediator's willingness to sacriÞce joint surplus in order to achieve a greater equality by α ∈ R + . In order to do it, we deÞne the preferences of the mediator as follows.
DeÞnition 1 Consider two vectors of payoffs for players i and j, (P i , P j ) and (P 0 i , P 0 j ). We say that a type-α mediator, m (α), (weakly) prefers the Þrst vector of payoffs to the second one, if and only if:
The left-hand side of this expression denotes how much more egalitarian is (P i , P j ) with respect to (P 0 i , P 0 j ), and the right-hand side expresses how much more efficient is (P 0 i , P 0 j ) with respect to (P i , P j ). This construction allows for two extreme cases:
• α → +∞ : Equality-seeking mediator. A sharing is preferred whenever is more egalitarian.
• α → 0 : Efficiency-seeking mediator. She selects the most egalitarian sharing, but only among those that are equally efficient.
Moreover, it allows for intermediate situations where the mediator is willing to sacriÞce some efficiency, in order to achieve a higher equality.
To understand better the role of the mediator, take the following example from a domestic conßict: Consider a wage negotiation between a Þrm and its workers. In case of conßict, that is, if workers go on strike, the Þrm will suffer much less from the conßict than the workers. Suppose that the negotiation takes place without the presence of a mediator: the "weaker" position of the workers makes that, at an eventual solution of the conßict, they will receive much less. But if the mediator intervenes in the negotiation process, and it is common knowledge that he will search for an equitable solution, then the solution may substantially differ, as we will see in the analysis of the model.
In the following sections, we analyze independently the two different scenarios: peacemaking and peacekeeping. In each case, we study the decision of the mediator of conducting direct or indirect negotiations.
In-conßict Negotiations (Peacemaking)
The players are in a peacemaking setting, that is, the negotiation takes place inside the conßict.
This implies that each player suffers a stream of costs while the negotiation takes place.
Direct (face-to-face) Negotiations
The two agents, 1 and 2, bargain à la Rubinstein over the division of a Þxed surplus, s. Time runs in discrete periods of equal length, numbered by the natural numbers. In an initial stage of the negotiation the mediator chooses which of the two players has the right to start the negotiation.
Denote the player who starts the negotiation as player i. In even (odd) periods player i (player j) makes an offer. The other party may accept, thus terminating the game with agreement at the proposed shares. If he rejects, bargaining goes on to the next round. Each period until an agreement is reached, agent 1 suffers a cost (1 − δ)c and agent 2 a cost of 0.
Proposition 1 For any c ∈ R + and δ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the game where agent 1 starts the negotiation. The payoffs, P * 1 and P * 2 , for agent 1 and 2 at equilibrium are:
For the game where agent 2 starts the negotiation, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs, P 0 1 and P 0 2 , are:
Now we come to analyze the difference in payoffs between the two players and the decision of the mediator of choosing who starts the negotiation.
Corollary 1
The SPE sharing has the following distributional properties:
• If the "strong" player (agent 2) starts the negotiation, then he receives a bigger share than the "weak" player (agent 1).
• If the "weak" player (agent 1) starts the negotiation, then he receives a bigger share than the "strong" player (agent 2) if and only if
Proof. Direct from the payoffs in Proposition 1.
This Corollary highlights the trade-off faced by the "weak" player. The fact that he bears higher conßict costs (c > 0) gives him a worse bargaining position with respect to the "strong"
player, but the Þrst-mover advantage is beneÞcial for him. The effect that dominates is determined by the value of the parameters of the model. If the overall size of the surplus to share is relatively high with respect to the conßict cost, then the positive effect associated with having the initiative in the negotiation dominates, and gives agent 1 a higher payoff in the Þnal sharing.
Proposition 2 In direct negotiations under peacemaking, the mediator will always choose the "weak" player (agent 1) to start the negotiation. Formally,
Proof. Direct from Proposition 1.
Indirect (mediated) Negotiations
The basic framework is that of indirect (mediated) bargaining with complete information. The two agents bargain à la Rubinstein. The main difference with the direct (face-to-face) case is the role of the mediator. She meets independently with each party and decides whether or not to submit each player's proposal to the other party.
The process is as follows: at any stage t the mediator meets with the party that has the right to make a proposal (player i). This player makes a proposal. Then the mediator decides whether or not to submit this proposal to player j. If player j receives the proposal, he can either accept it or reject it. If he accepts, the game ends. If he rejects, or if he does not receive i 0 s proposal, he has the right to make a counter-proposal to the mediator at stage t + 1, and the process is repeated.
Characterization of the Equilibrium with Mediator We Þrst solve the equilibrium for all possible types of mediators, that is, for all the possible values of α. Then, we comment on the two extreme cases and on the evolution of the equilibrium payoffs depending on the preferences of the mediator.
We restrict the analysis to stationary strategies. The following stationary strategies for the two agents that are involved in the negotiation, are the only stationary strategies that can be optimal: agent 1 always offers (x, s − x) and rejects anything less than w. Agent 2 always offers (y, s − y) and rejects anything less than z. The reason is that if any of the players decides to reject an offer, then he must reject any other offer that is strictly worse for him. Moreover, at equilibrium, each player will offer the minimum amount that the other agent will accept and that the mediator still submits. This implies that w = y and z = s − x.
The following conditions are necessary for the strategies above mentioned to be a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE). The optimal strategy of the mediator is determined by conditions (M1) and (M2). The mediator, when a player makes an offer, has to decide whether to submit it to the other party or not. She will submit the proposal whenever the proposed sharing is preferred to the one induced by the continuation of the game, taking into account, both efficiency and equality. Condition (M1) ensures that the offer made by agent 1 will not be blocked by the mediator, that is, the mediator prefers
is the analogous condition for the offer of agent 2. We do not need to specify the mediator's strategy because the equilibrium payoffs that arise from these conditions are unique.
Note that the left-hand side of the mediator's condition is the cost in efficiency terms of blocking a proposal and delaying the agreement one period (parametrized by the mediator's type α). The right-hand side is the difference in the equality of the proposals.
The equilibrium of this game has the following properties: the SSPE payoffs can be cathegorized in three branches. First, if α (i.e., the capacity of the mediator to sacriÞce efficiency in terms of equality) is sufficiently low, the mediator is, at equilibrium, completely inactive.
The negotiation is conducted as if there was no Þlter to the agents' proposals. As a result, the equilibrium sharing coincides with the obtained in the direct negotiation case, since the binding conditions are (1) and (2).
On the other extreme, if α is sufficiently high and, at the same time, the damage caused by the conßict is relatively low (i.e. s c is sufficiently large), the equilibrium is fully mediated. This means that the threat of blocking proposals is binding for both agents (conditions (M1) and (M2)). This way, neither party can fully beneÞt from his position as a proposer.
For intermediate cases, the equilibrium is partially mediated. In this range of parameter values, the mediator's position is not strong enough to drive completely the negotiation but it still has some inßuence over the outcome. At equilibrium, the mediator threats the strong player in order to reduce his advantage as a proposer, but allows the weak player to completely proÞt from his position when he has the right to propose (the binding conditions are (2) and (M2)).
The following Proposition describes the equilibria of this game. The different equilibrium payoffs for each of the branches are described in the proof of the Proposition that is provided in the Appendix. We use the following notation:
Proposition 3
In indirect negotiations with a type-α mediator, the mediator's role in the SSPE is as follows:
• If α ≤ min {1, α 3 } , then the mediator is inactive.
• If α ≥ max {α 1 , α 2 } and
, then the equilibrium is fully mediated.
• If α ≥ 1 and
, then the equilibrium is partially mediated.
• If α 3 ≤ α ≤ α 4 and
, then the mediator is inactive or partially mediated.
Proof. See Appendix. [Insert Figure 1 ] Some insights can be extracted from this general characterization. First, note that the mediator's willingness to sacriÞce efficiency on the grounds of a higher equality (parametrized in the model by α) crucially determines the outcome of the negotiations. This commitment to achieve equality, even at the cost of destroying resources if necessary, gives credibility to the mediator's threat to block proposals and, hence, alters the equilibrium sharing. Second, an important element that affects the mediator's capacity to inßuence the negotiation is how costly the conßict is. The relative damage of continuing the conßict with respect to the total amount of resources to share (i.e., s c ) measures how costly it is for the mediator to actually intervene in the negotiation.
In order to extract more insights on the implications of an active mediator, we consider now the prediction that Proposition 3 makes for the two extreme cases of the preferences of the mediator, that is, efficiency-seeking mediator (α → 0), and equality-seeking mediator (α → +∞).
Proposition 4 If α = 0 (efficiency-seeking mediator), the two negotiation processes, that is, direct and indirect, are equivalent.
Proof. Direct from Proposition 3.
This Proposition conÞrms our previous claim that only mediators that can credibly commit to delay the negotiations (and, hence, destroy resources), do have an impact on the Þnal sharing. Otherwise, they become simple passive actors. This can be interpreted, in fact, as an illustration of the "outside option" principle: only threats that are credible will have an effect on the outcome. 5 Let us move now to the opposite, and more interesting, case.
Proposition 5
In indirect negotiations with an equality-seeking mediator (α −→ +∞), there exists a unique SSPE in which the offers made by the players are the following:
• If
Proof. Direct from the Proof of Proposition 3 in Appendix. 5 See, for instance, Sutton (1986) , for a clear and intuitive explanation of this principle.
Several insights emerge from this Proposition. The Þrst, and most obvious one is that, even if the mediator is willing to completely sacriÞce efficiency in order to achieve a higher equality, she is not able to induce a fully egalitarian sharing. The reason is that the existence of conßict costs that affects more one player than the other, is a source of inequality that undermines the capacity of the mediator. The tool the mediator has to increase the egalitarianism of the sharing is to threaten the proposer with blocking his offer (implying a delay in the resolution of the conßict). The larger asymmetry of conßict costs, the more inequality this blocking will generate and, therefore, the weaker the position of the mediator (the less credible her threat).
This implies that, even in the extreme case in which the mediator would postpone indeÞnitely the agreement if needed, she is not capable of forcing any of the players to make a fully egalitarian offer.
Second, the structure of the equilibrium is different, depending on the values of the param-
, the equilibrium offers are completely determined by the mediator's threats to block their proposals (see in the proof that in this case the binding conditions that determine the equilibrium offers are (M1) and (M2)). In this case, neither player can, at equilibrium, fully beneÞt from his position as a proposer. However, if s is relatively low with respect to the conßict cost (c) (that is, when
), the equilibrium conÞguration is different. In this case, the position of agent 1 is very weak with respect to agent 2 and, hence, the mediator allows the former to fully use his advantage when he is the proposer (agent 1's offer is determined by the acceptance-rejection decision of agent 2). At the same time, the mediator restricts the Þrst-mover-advantage of agent 2 (the strongest) using her power to block proposals.
Focusing on the Þrst case, we can see the most striking and, at Þrst sight, most counterintuitive result of the mediator's intervention. When the weak player is the proposer, his share of the surplus is increasing in his own conßict costs. In the direct negotiation case, the result was completely the opposite. The reasoning was simple: the larger the conßict cost of one player, the smaller his bargaining power and, hence, the smaller share of the surplus he gets. However, this reasoning fails here, because the player's equilibrium offers are not determined by the other player's reaction, but by the mediator's blocking threat.
In a sense, the "competitor" of agent 1 is not directly agent 2, but rather the mediator. The stronger the position of the mediator, the less capacity will have agent 1 to exploit his advantage as a proposer, and vice versa. The higher c, the less credible will be the mediator's threat to block proposals, as this would imply an important source of inequality in the Þnal sharing. As a result, the larger c, the bigger the share that agent 1 can ask for himself, without triggering a block from the mediator. This paradoxical result can also be restated in other terms: the quest for equality makes the mediator become an agent for the weak player.
The example of the wage negotiation that we referred to in Section 2 may help to clarify this point: as we already argued, in the absence of a mediator, the position of the workers is much weaker and, hence, in the eventual solution of the conßict they would receive much less. When a mediator steps in, if it is common knowledge that this mediator will search for an equitable solution, things change dramatically. Now, the weak party, the workers, can use their high losses if the conßict continues, as a strategic threat. The fact that they know the mediator will not allow the conßict to continue, gives them a very strong position at the expense of the ex-ante strongest party, the Þrm.
As a consequence of this effect, we have the following result.
Corollary 2 When α → ∞, the mediator achieves a higher equality by giving the initiative to the strongest player in the conßict. Formally,
Proof. See Appendix.
Once again, we see how the presence of an active mediator has very important implications.
The fact that the mediator's intervention reinforces the negotiation position of the weak player implies that, contrary to the direct negotiation case, more equality can be achieved by giving the initiative in the negotiation to the ex-ante strong player, as he has a weaker position with respect to the mediator.
Finally, one can see how the mediator's activity, instead of improving over the direct negotiations in terms of equality, can turn out to be detrimental. To show it, we compare the payoffs achieved with direct and indirect negotiations.
From the Proposition above, we know that the payoffs of the indirect (mediated) negotiation (with the strongest player (player 2) proposing Þrst) are:
.
From the analysis already performed, we know that the payoffs of the direct (face-to-face)
negotiations are:
In Corollary 3 below, we compare the degree of inequality in the presence and in the absence of the mediator:
Corollary 3 There exist two thresholds in the discount factor, (δ 1 , δ 2 ) , 0 < δ 1 < δ 2 < 1 such that:
• If δ ≤ δ 1 the equality achieved is higher when conducting mediated negotiations.
• If δ ∈ (δ 1 , δ 2 ) the equality achieved is lower when conducting mediated negotiations.
• If δ ≥ δ 2 the equality achieved is higher when conducting mediated negotiations.
[Insert Figure 2 ]
The result of this Corollary can be, at Þrst sight, counterintuitive: the presence of an active mediator that threatens the parties with blocking "unequal" proposals, may imply, ex-post, a higher degree of inequality. The explanation for this has to do with the nature of the mediator's intervention. The presence of conßict costs reduces the effective capacity of the mediator to equalize payoffs, and this weakness will be strategically used by the players in their own beneÞt.
For extreme cases of δ, the intervention of the mediator always improves over the face-to-face situation. When the value of δ is very low, then the Þrst-mover advantage of the initial proposer is very important, and the "blocking" capacity of the mediator effectively reduces its impact on the Þnal sharing. On the other extreme, when δ is sufficiently high the mediator's intervention is very successful, since the higher the degree of patience of the players, the higher the capacity of the mediator to induce an egalitarian sharing.
However, for intermediate values of δ, the inequality of the face-to-face negotiation is relatively low: the Þrst-mover-advantage of the "weak" player allows him to compensate for his higher conßict costs in such a way that the Þnal sharing is relatively balanced. The intervention of the mediator in this case does not improve the equality achieved in a direct negotiation, since the players use strategically the "weakness" of the mediation activity, that comes from the presence of conßict costs, in their own beneÞt.
Preconßict Negotiations (Peacekeeping)
The players are in a peacekeeping setting, where negotiations take place previous to a potential conßict. These games correspond to situations with no-cooperation as an outside option. The players that bargain over the division of the surplus have the option of breaking out negotiations and go to the conßict. If this happens, they receive their outside option payoffs, that will be denoted by (P * i , P * j ). These payoffs will be determined by the outcome of the peacemaking negotiations. We state the general results in the following Lemma and Proposition, for any outside payoffs that satisfy s ≥ P * i + P * j . In a posterior analysis, we concentrate on a particular case of payoffs to be able to extract more interesting implications of the mediator's activity.
Direct (face-to-face) Negotiations
In even (odds) periods player i (player j) makes an offer. The other party may accept and the game ends with agreement at the proposed shares. Alternatively, if he rejects, either of the two parties may decide to start the conßict, in which case both receive their outside payoffs,
. If the offer is rejected but neither player opts out, then bargaining goes on to the following round.
The framework and solution is the one used in Ponsatí and Sákovics (1998), but we restrict attention to stationary strategies (independent of t) and we allow the outside payoffs of the players to be negative. We Þrst prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 In a direct negotiation under a peacekeeping scenario, for any outside payoffs (P * i , P * j ) ∈ R 2 , such that s ≥ P * i + P * j , immediate agreement at (s − P * j , P * j ) is an outcome that can be supported by a SSPE, when player i is the Þrst to propose. Moreover, it is the unique SSPE when
Otherwise, the outcomes that can be supported by a SSPE are immediate efficient agreements that give player i a payoff in
Proof. Consider the following strategies: if player i is the proposer he always asks for s−P * j ; the responder accepts any proposal that is not worse than the (candidate) equilibrium proposal; if the proposer asks for more, then the responder rejects and takes his outside option; if the responder does not accept a proposal, the proposer opts out. It is straightforward to verify that these strategies constitute a SSPE.
To prove the second part of the Lemma, note that for the lowest possible share for player i to get at equilibrium we need the following: player i should (weakly) prefer continuing to opting out when player j rejects his proposal. Otherwise, the only candidate equilibrium offer will be for player i to ask for s − P * j , because player j 0 s threat to reject would not be credible. From this, we know that the continuation value of player i from the next period must be at least P * i δ . Since player j should be indifferent between accepting and waiting for next period, his maximum possible share is δ
δ´. By symmetry, the maximum possible share for player i is δ ³ s − P * j δ´, and therefore,
δ´. Given these conditions, both players (weakly) prefer this agreement to their option. It is straightforward to see that these conditions are also sufficient.
Note that a necessary condition for having multiplicity of equilibria is that δs > P * i + P * j . In the posterior analysis, we concentrate on a particular vector of outside payoffs from the peacemaking negotiation to extract more meaningful implications of the mediator's activity.
Since these payoffs do not satisfy this condition, we study in what follows the case where the unique SSPE payoffs are (s − P * j , P * j ). From the Lemma above, we observe that, at equilibrium, the proposer threatens with opting out if his offer is rejected, and this behaviour is always credible. This has a direct implication for the relationship between peacemaking and peacekeeping: in a peacekeeping setting, where the agents face a direct negotiation with the outside option of moving to a peacemaking situation, the outcome is completely determined by the outcome of the peacemaking process.
This implies that the equilibrium sharing with peacekeeping is, in fact, the same as with peacemaking. In the absence of an active mediator, therefore, even if the players are not actually in conßict, the sharing is as if they were in it.
Indirect (mediated) Negotiations
The game that we analyze is as follows: at any stage t, the mediator meets with the party that has the right to make a proposal (player i). This player makes a proposal. The mediator meets with player j and decides whether or not to submit to him the proposal of player i. If player j receives the proposal and accepts, the game ends. If j rejects (or does not receive the offer), either of the two parties may decide to start the conßict. If the offer is rejected (or not submitted) but neither player opts out, bargaining goes on to the following round.
There are interesting effects that may arise when we allow the mediator to intervene in a peacekeeping scenario, that is, before any of the players opts out and moves to a peacemaking situation. First, the lack of conßict costs per-period of delay in peacekeeping negotiations, makes the mediator be less constrained about efficiency considerations, which may ease her intervention in terms of achieving a higher equality, for a given level of α. Second, this effect can be outweighed, since the player that loses by this increased equality may have more incentives to opt out and start the conßict. The formal statement of the results is the subject of the following Proposition.
Proposition 6 For the mediated game in a peacekeeping situation with outside options, where the outside payoffs are such that s ≥ P * i + P * j , the SSPE payoffs (x * i , s − x * i ) are:
• If P * i ≤ P * j −¯s − 2P * j¯, and if not, whenever
, then
• Otherwise,
From this general case, we can extract some preliminary insights on the role of a mediator in a peacekeeping negotiation. First, and fully consistent with our previous results, a necessary condition for the mediator to have an active role in the negotiation process is that she is actually willing to sacriÞce efficiency in order to induce a higher equality. Otherwise, she becomes a purely passive observer. However, and contrary to the peacemaking case, this necessary condition is not sufficient. In this setting it can be the case that, even a fully equality-seeking mediator (α → ∞), is incapable of altering the equilibrium sharing. This occurs when the sharing that results from the outside options is very unbalanced against the proposer and, thus, the mediator loses her capacity to effectively threaten him.
In those cases in which the mediator actually alters the distribution, her intervention is of a different nature than in a peacemaking environment. In a peacekeeping negotiation, the threat of the mediator is not to reduce the proposer's Þrst-mover advantage and give it to the responder, but rather to actually reinforce the implicit threat made by the proposer himself of moving to the conßict. This is the best the mediator can aim at achieving, since the outside option is a safe outcome for the players.
Let us now move to a more speciÞc case in which we can extract more meaningful implications of the mediator's activity: the equality-seeking mediator (α → ∞). Moreover, when negotiations are broken, the outside option is, in fact, the beginning of the conßict. This means that the agents will suffer one round of damages (with costs (1 − δ) c for player 1 and 0 for player 2) and will continue negotiating under a peacemaking environment. 6 Then, the actual value of the outside option is: 7
Note that this is the most natural case of study. The parties try to negotiate in the absence of a conßict and they know that if, eventually, one of the parties decides to start the conßict, this 6 We assume that there is no delay in the start of the negotiations after the conßict breaks out. This allows us to eliminate a purely artiÞcial source of equity given by discounting (that reduces the present value of the differences in payoffs across agents). 7 The posterior analysis and results correspond to the main range of the parameter space. It only does not cover the case with δ ∈ [δ1, e δ] and , the results obtained in Corollaries 4 and 5 and Proposition 7 are the opposite.
We disregard these last cases since the range of parameters that satisfy them is of small signiÞcance.
will imply a ßow of damages (unevenly distributed among the players) and the continuation of the negotiations in a new scenario (peacemaking). Focusing on this case, we Þnd the following corollaries:
Corollary 4 An equality-seeking mediator (α → ∞) will, at equilibrium:
• Always be able to affect the equality of the sharing when the "strong" player moves Þrst.
• Never be able to affect the equality of the sharing when the "weak" player moves Þrst.
Proof. When α → ∞, the mediator can alter the equilibrium proposal of the player with the right to start the negotiation (player i) if and only if
Consider Þrst the case i = 2 (i.e., the strong player). Using the fact that P * 1 < P * 2 it is straightforward to see that the above condition is always fulÞlled for the equilibrium values.
Conversely, consider the case i = 1 (i.e., the weak player). Substituting the equilibrium values for P * 1 and P * 2 , we rewrite the above condition as
And this condition never holds, since P
Again, and analogous to a peacemaking situation, we observe how giving the initiative to the weak player is a source of problems for the mediator. Recall that, in a peacemaking negotiation, the reason was that the weak player was able to make more demanding proposals, exploiting the fact that, if they were blocked by the mediator, this would imply high damages for him. In a peacekeeping setting, the result, although related, is of a different nature. Here, the effect is not quantitative (submitting more uneven proposals) but rather qualitative (when the mediator is really active). The quantitative aspect is lost, since the players always link their proposals to Þxed quantities (the outside option). What the mediator loses by giving the initiative to the weak player is the capacity to effectively threaten the proposer with executing the outside option, as this sharing would be very unbalanced.
Corollary 5
In peacekeeping, when the mediator's intervention alters the behavior of the players, the equality achieved is always smaller than in peacemaking.
Proof. First, in peacekeeping, if the mediator is active, the payoff of the proposer is
It is straightforward to see that the equality induced is higher, the higher is α. For α → ∞ we have (substituting the equilibrium values for the outside option payoffs):
Since x * i > s 2 , then the inequality of the sharing is given by:
As in peacemaking we have shown that P
, then:
This completes the proof.
Even if, in peacemaking negotiations, the fact of being in conßict was a source of weakness for the mediator, the situation in peacekeeping environments, instead of improving, turns out to be even worse. The reason is that, even if in peacekeeping negotiations when the mediator delays the agreement this does not imply a priori conßict costs for the parties, the agents link the rejection of their proposals to the beginning of the conßict. This severely undermines the capacity of the mediator to induce an egalitarian sharing.
It is direct to see that, if the mediator can actually affect the proposer's strategy and, hence, the sharing of the surplus, the distribution is completely determined by the value of the outside option of the players. This implies that the equilibrium level of inequality is the same independently of which player starts the negotiation. 8 This is in contrast with the result in peacemaking, where the mediator strictly preferred to give the initiative to the ex-ante "strong" player.
However, so far, we have not seen when the presence of an active mediator is really beneÞcial in terms of equality. That is, we have not compared the degree of inequality obtained with indirect (mediated) negotiations with that resulting from a direct (face-to-face) negotiation. By doing so, we Þnd:
In a peacekeeping environment, undertaking mediated negotiations never generates a higher equality than a direct negotiation in which the weak player is the Þrst proposer.
Proof. Follows directly from comparing the equilibrium sharing in Lemma 1 and Proposition
6.
This result shows the extent to which the position of the mediator is weakened in a peacekeeping scenario. Her intervention by threatening the parties with blocking their proposals, is completely unable to induce a more egalitarian sharing than if she allowed the parties to negotiate directly (giving the initiative to the weak player ). Moreover, it can be checked that, whenever the mediator is active at equilibrium, i.e., she actually alters the proposals of the players, then her presence is detrimental for equality.
The intuition for this result is the following: in the direct negotiation case (Ponsatí and Sákovics, 1998), even the weak player, when being the proposer, can credibly commit to opting out, which prevents the responder from using all his bargaining power. When the mediator intervenes (indirect negotiation case), the proposer has to credibly threat, not only the responder, but also the mediator. Since the mediator has preferences over equality and efficiency, the proposers "lose" bargaining power with respect to the responders when α increases since, for a sufficiently high α, the mediator may prefer not to submit a given offer and go to the outside option. The threat of the mediator to actually implement the outside option is, in this case, detrimental
Conclusion
We have proposed a model of bargaining that allows us to analyze and compare the role of mediation in conßicts of different nature, where two parties negotiate to share a Þxed surplus.
We have distinguished between peacemaking (in-conßict) negotiations and peacekeeping (preconßict) negotiations. The main difference is that in a peacemaking scenario, since the conßict has already started, the players bear costs per-period of conßict. Since these costs are different, the players are asymmetric.
We analyze the negotiations in a peacemaking scenario in order to study the role of a mediator that strategically intervenes in the bargaining process. We observe two important implications of this analysis: Þrst, even if the mediator is willing to sacriÞce completely efficiency in order to achieve a higher equality, she is not able to induce a fully egalitarian sharing. Second, prove that more equality can be achieved by giving the initiative in the negotiation process to the ex-ante strong player (in contrast with unmediated bargaining processes). This can be explained by the fact that, in mediated negotiations, the weak player has a strong position with respect to the mediator, who becomes, in fact, the real "competitor" of the player.
In a peacekeeping scenario, the conßict is not active yet and it is only a potential outcome of the process. In this setting, the absence of conßict costs would, in principle, help the mediator in achieving a higher equality of the Þnal agreement. But the result is completely the opposite.
In peacekeeping negotiations, the agents use the threat of starting the conßict, and, as a result, the position of the mediator, and her capacity to induce an egalitarian sharing, is weakened with respect to peacemaking negotiations.
At this point we can bring back the interview with a UN international negotiator, quoted in the Introduction. The words by Françesc Vendrell seemed support a particular strategy of negotiation: The option of conducting indirect (mediated) negotiations is better in peacemaking environments, while direct (face-to-face) negotiations dominate in peacekeeping settings. Our results are consistent with Vendrell's choice. First, we have seen that, in many instances, a mediated negotiation can achieve more equality than a direct one in a peacemaking environment.
In this situation, the capacity of the mediator to "Þlter" proposals between the parties can be a useful distributive tool. Second, we have shown that in peacekeeping negotiations, this is no longer the case. Using the mediator as a Þlter between the two parties can never increase the egalitarianism of the Þnal sharing and, hence, never improves over a direct negotiation.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that this model has to be seen as a Þrst step in a new line of research. We believe that studying the impact that a mediator (understood as a strategic player)
can have over an ongoing negotiation process, is a potentially fruitful area of research. Despite their interest, these issues, however, remained unattended by the literature. In this model we have dealt with a simple, yet interesting case: mediation under complete information. The next natural step is to study these same issues in a richer framework, where the parties negotiate in a two-sided asymmetric information environment. This would allow to analyze the capacity of the mediator to affect, not only the equality of the Þnal sharing, but also the efficiency achieved.
Proof. (Proposition 1)
(following Fudenberg and Tirole (1996) ) Consider the following (stationary) strategies: player 1 always offers (x, s − x) and rejects anything less than y. Player 2 always offers (y, s − y) and rejects anything less than s − x. The following conditions are necessary for the strategies above mentioned to be a subgame perfect equilibrium:
Note that conditions (1) and (2) have to be satisÞed with equality since each player will offer the lowest share that the other will accept. Taking (1) and (2) together with equality, we get the following:
With these offers, also conditions (3) and (4) are satisÞed, since s > −c.
To prove uniqueness of equilibria, call s 1 the supremum of the payments of player 1 at any subgame perfect equilibrium and s 1 , the inÞmum of these payoffs. Similarly, call s 2 and s 2 , for player 2.
Player 1 offers (x, s − x). Player 2 accepts for sure if
But any x lower than this value cannot be part of a subgame perfect equilibrium, since player 1 would be better off offering exactly that value. Therefore,
We use the same argument for player j, and obtain
Since player 2 can obtain at least δs 2 , he would not accept anything less, so the most that player 1 can guarantee himself when making an offer is s − δs 2 . Therefore,
and, similarly,
Together (1) and (4) bring us to
and, (2) and (3) to
We can conclude with (5) and (6) that
and the same for player 2
And since this is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, each player should accept when his shares are the ones at equilibrium.
Proof. (Proposition 3)
We Þrst prove the following intermediate result that will help us to characterize the equilibrium outcomes:
• If at equilibrium (1) is not binding, then y ≤ s 2 .
• If at equilibrium (2) is not binding, then x ≥ s 2 .
Consider, Þrst, the case in which (1) is not binding and assume that the equilibrium is such that y > s 2 . Consider the following deviation for player 2 when he is the proposer: y 0 = y − ε, with ε > 0 and sufficiently small. Since (1) was not binding, there exist values of ε > 0 for which this condition still holds and, therefore, player 1 still Þnds the offer acceptable. Moreover, since y > s 2 , the condition M2 is still fulÞlled for y 0 and the new offer of player 2 is not blocked by the mediator. Therefore, player 2 has a proÞtable deviation since the new offer gives him a larger share of the surplus. An analogous argument allows to show that x < s 2 cannot be sustained as an equilibrium when (2) is not binding. Now we prove that the equilibrium outcome cannot be such that conditions (1) and (M1) are binding. In this case, the only candidate equilibrium payoffs are the following (restricting to y ≤ s 2 and δ(2x − s) ≤ (1 − δ)c, since the rest of the cases are eliminated because either condition (2) or (M2) are not satisÞed):
But in this case we can prove that these payoffs are not compatible with δ(2x − s) ≤ (1 − δ)c.
We are now in the position to fully characterize the outcome of the indirect (mediated)
negotiations, in the presence of a type-α mediator. We use the following notation:
The offers made by the players in the SSPE are the following:
• If α 3 ≤ α ≤ α 2 , there is multiplicity of equilibria:
-If α ≥ α 4 , the equilibria are (PM 1 ) and (PM 2 ).
-If 1 ≤ α ≤ α 4 , the equilibria are (PM 1 ) and (PM 2 ) and (IM).
-If α ≤ 1, the equilibria are (IM) and (PM 1 ).
Case 1 (Inactive mediator-IM)
Conditions (1) and (2) hold with equality. If this happens we obtain (x, s − x) and (y, s − y)
from the direct negotiation case, that is,
We have to check if there exists some value of α that makes that these payoffs satisfy conditions (M1) and (M2):
(M2)
. Then, we also have:
In this case, we can prove that (M1) is always satisÞed because
If we check for (M2), we get:
And this is satisÞed iff α ≤ 1.
If we rewrite (M1):
If we rewrite (M2):
So the necessary condition is (M2), and therefore we need:
(note that this value is higher than 1 iff
Again, rewriting (M1) and (M2) we obtain,
and since (1 − δ)(s + c) > z 1 , the necessary condition is again (M2), which, to be satisÞed,
We can conclude that there exists a minimum value of α, α min = max n 1,
under which the candidate equilibrium payoffs are the ones obtained from the direct (face-toface) negotiation.
Case 2 (Fully mediated-FM)
Conditions (M1) and (M2) hold with equality, that is,
Note Þrst that, in this case, we must have x ≥ s 2 and y ≤ s 2 . Otherwise, players 1 and 2, respectively, would have a beneÞcial deviation. Therefore, we can rewrite the conditions in the following way:
In this case, we obtain,
We have to check if conditions (1) and (2) of equilibrium are satisÞed.
We get the following conditions:
Necessary condition for (1) to be satisÞed: α ≥ 1.
Necessary condition for (2) to be satisÞed:
, this condition is never satisÞed.
-If
, we need the following condition for existence of equilibrium:
We can easily prove that condition (ii) implies (i).
Since we are in the case where (1 − δ)c ≥ δ(2x − s), we need the following condition for this to hold:
o and
, the candidate equilibrium offers are the previous ones. 
A sufficient condition for this to be satisÞed is α < 
We check the conditions for (1) and (2) to be satisÞed.
Necessary condition for (1) to be satisÞed is
Then, if 
Case 3 (Partially mediated-PM)
We study the case when conditions (2) and (M2) are binding, which again implies that, at equilibrium, y ≤ Checking for all the conditions required we get the following necessary conditions for the above offers to be an equilibrium: Given all these candidate equilibria, we can check that, for the cases 1 and 3, there exists an overlapping of equilibrium offers for some regions.
Proof. (Corollary 2)
Given the payoffs obtained for the case when α → +∞, we can easily prove the following:
• For the case , while the difference if it is the strongest player the one who starts is
• For the case This completes the proof.
Proof. (Corollary 3)
First we can compute ∆P Dpm as follows: Note that ∆P Dpm = 0 for δ = e δ, and it is decreasing in δ for δ ≤ e δ and increasing in δ for δ ≥ e δ.
In the same way, note that ∆P Ipm decreases with δ.
Proof. (Proposition 6)
When the outside payoffs are such that s = P * i + P * j , note that, since the outside payoffs sum up to s, and the players have the possibility of opting out at any time of the game, the only equilibrium agreement is exactly their outside payoffs, because neither player will accept anything less.
In the case where s > P * i + P * j , since we concentrate in the case where the threat of breaking the negotiations and moving to the outside option is always credible for the proposer, the optimal strategy of the proposer will always be as follows: propose (x i , s − x i ) and break the 
